This study proposes a framework for examining the effects of retaking tests in operational selection settings. A central feature of this framework is the distinction between within-person and between-person retest effects. This framework is used to develop hypotheses about retest effects for exemplars of 3 types of tests (knowledge tests, cognitive ability tests, and situational judgment tests) and to test these hypotheses in a high stakes selection setting (admission to medical studies in Belgium). Analyses of within-person retest effects showed that mean scores of repeat test takers were one-third of a standard deviation higher for the knowledge test and situational judgment test and one-half of a standard deviation higher for the cognitive ability test. The validity coefficients for the knowledge test differed significantly depending on whether examinees' test scores on the first versus second administration were used, with the latter being more valid. Analyses of between-person retest effects on the prediction of academic performance showed that the same test score led to higher levels of performance for those passing on the first attempt than for those passing on the second attempt. The implications of these results are discussed in light of extant retesting practice.
In employment settings, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978) state that organizations should provide a reasonable opportunity to test takers for retesting. Hence, most organizations in the private and public sector have installed retesting policies in promotion and hiring situations (e.g., Campbell, 2004; McElreath, Bayless, Reilly, & Hayes, 2004) . In the educational domain, the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (APA/AERA/NCME, 1999) state that retest opportunities should be provided for tests used for promotion or graduation decisions. The opportunity for retesting is also mandated for tests used in making admission, licensing, or certification decisions.
There appear to be at least two broad rationales behind endorsing retesting. The first is that retesting is warranted due to the possibility that the initial assessment was an error, either due to a transient characteristic of the applicant at the time of testing (e.g., illness, disability), to a transient characteristic of the testing situation (e.g., deviations from standardized test administration procedures), or to random measurement error. The second is the possibility that candidates have improved their standing on the construct of interest during the interval between two administrations.
To date, empirical research on retesting in operational selection settings is very scarce. Almost all studies have examined retest effects in laboratory settings. In these experimental designs, subjects took a practice test (parallel or identical to a criterion test) under standardized conditions before being given the criterion test shortly thereafter . The type of test under study was virtually always a cognitive ability test. A key limitation of these laboratory studies is that they do not address questions that organizations are likely to face in operational selection contexts. For example, which statistical approaches can organizations use for examining retest effects in operational selection situations? What is the size of retest effects for tests other than cognitive ability? Do test scores of repeat test takers lead to the same level of performance as test scores of one-time test takers? On a more fundamental level, retesting involves various within-person (i.e., a comparison of scores of the same person taking the same test multiple times) and between-person (i.e., a comparison of scores of one-time test takers with those of repeat test takers) retest issues that are yet poorly understood.
Therefore, this study proposes a framework for addressing questions about retesting in operational selection settings that outlines the different retest effects, their conceptual meanings and practical implications, and the statistical tests that can be used. Next, we use the framework to develop hypotheses regarding the impact of retaking exemplars of three types of tests (a knowledge test, a cognitive ability test, and a situational judgment test, SJT). Finally, we apply the framework to examine retesting in an operational selection context, namely the admission to medical studies in Belgium.
A Framework for Retesting in Operational Selection Settings
Retest effects can be defined as test score changes after prior exposure to an identical test or to an alternate form of this test under standardized conditions. Using this definition, retest effects encompass both practice and coaching effects (Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, & Kulik, 1984; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981; Sackett, Burris, & Ryan, 1989 
Within-Person Retest Effects
Within-person retest effects refer to effects associated with the same group of individuals who retake an identical test or an alternate form of the test. In selection practice, an examination of retest effects is typically equated with investigating whether multiple administrations of a test improve individuals' mean test performance (see Campbell, 2004; McElreath et al., 2004) . To examine whether there is a significant difference between test means of the same individuals across two examinations, organizations typically use a paired samples t-test or compute an effect size of mean differences (Cohen's d).
Tests of mean score changes across the same individuals have practical relevance for organizations and for individuals. Organizations might compare the size of the observed retest effects to findings in test manuals or in the extant literature. Next, decisions to switch to other tests might be informed by information about retest effects. Findings about retest effects also have implications for candidates' assessment of the prospects for change should they decide to retest. In fact, it informs them about their chances to be rank ordered among those selected on the second administration.
Besides comparing mean test scores across administrations, organizations might also examine the more fundamental issue as to whether retaking a test affects the relationship of the test with the criterion (i.e., the validity of the test). To this end, one might compare the correlation between individuals' original test score and the criterion with the correlation between individuals' repeat test score and the criterion, using Meng, Rosenthal, and Rubin's (1992) Z-test for the difference between dependent correlations.
As mentioned in Table 1 , results of possible changes in test-criterion validities due to retesting have important implications for operational selection practice. First, retesting is commonly done on the assumption that the most recent score will be the more valid one. An examination of test-criterion validities might provide support for this common retesting policy. Second, researchers meta-analyzing the validity of tests might also have multiple scores of the same candidates on the same test available. Third, it is important for candidates to know which of their test scores provides the most accurate assessment of their knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs).
Between-Person Retest Effects
In operational selection settings, applicant pools are typically a mixture of first-time test takers and repeat test takers. This common selection situation opens various between-person issues for organizations that have been largely ignored. A first issue is whether one-time test takers score better than repeat test takers. Organizations can examine this issue by conducting an independent samples t-test and/or computing an effect size measure. However, such an examination is not informative because the result is uninterpretable. The key point is that the comparison of one-time and repeat test takers is heavily influenced by the proportion passing the test and is likely affected by organizational feedback policies. For example, consider the following scenarios. Repeat test takers are likely to produce mean scores far lower than one-time test takers in a scenario with a high passing rate: if 90% pass, then repeat test takers come from the bottom 10% of the distribution. Conversely, repeat test takers may be very similar to one-time test takers when the passing rate is very low: if only 10% pass, then repeat test takers are drawn from 90% of the full applicant pool. In short, the question of mean score differences between one-time and repeat test takers is heavily influenced by situational factors, and the magnitude of the difference is not generally interpretable as an indicator of the degree to which test scores change upon retesting.
Second, similar to within-person comparisons, it is useful to compare the criterion-related validity of scores produced by one-time test takers with scores produced by repeat test takers. Differences in validity would have implications for expected levels of validity in applied settings. For instance, a finding of a weaker predictor-criterion relationship among repeat test takers would indicate that a lower level of validity would be expected in a validation sample including both one-time test takers and repeat test takers than in a sample made up solely of one-time test takers.
As a third issue related to between-person effects, it is useful to examine whether the entry-gaining score for the group of repeat test takers predicts as well as the entry-gaining score for the group of one-time test takers. In other words, does a given test score result in the same expected level of criterion performance regardless of whether it is an initial score or a retest score? We posit here that this question is conceptually similar to that asked in the domain of predictive bias by subgroup and that it can be tested with the moderated multiple regression model that is widely used in that domain (Cleary, 1968; Lautenschlager & Mendoza, 1986; Sackett, Laczo, & Lippe, 2003) .
Adapting this model to the retesting domain, consider a regression model relating test scores to a criterion. The scores represent the entry-gaining score for each test taker. For some, the entry-gaining score is the initial attempt at taking the test; for others, the entry-gaining score is a retest. The inclusion of a dummy variable reflecting whether a test score is an initial attempt or a retest provides a test of intercept differences between the two groups (i.e., whether a given test score produces a systematically different level of criterion performance if it is an initial test than if it is a retest). Adding an interaction term (test score multiplied by the dummy variable reflecting initial test vs. retest) provides a test of slope differences between initial and repeat test takers.
The results of applying this model have implications for practice (see Table 1 ). In fact, the possibility that a repeat test score may signal a different level of performance than the same score by a one-time test taker merits attention because decisions about selected applicants (e.g., placement into jobs, assignments to training programs, or promotions) may be based on predicted performance levels.
Development of Hypotheses
In this section, we use our framework to develop hypotheses for the effects of retaking three exemplars of tests, namely cognitive ability tests, knowledge tests, and SJTs. Cognitive ability and knowledge tests are widely used for employment decisions and educational admissions due to their validity for predicting job and academic performance (Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2001; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) . A focus on SJTs is relevant given the recent interest to use these tests as supplements to cognitive tests in employment (McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, & Braverman, 2001 ) and educational settings (Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005; Oswald, Schmitt, Kim, Ramsay, & Gillespie, 2004) .
Within-Person Retest Effects
As noted earlier, extensive research evidence has accumulated with regard to the effects of repeat administrations of cognitive ability tests (Burke, 1997; DerSimonian & Laird, 1983; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981; Powers, 1986; Powers & Rock, 1999) . , for instance, conducted a meta-analysis of practice effects related to cognitive ability. The average effect size was .42 (for identical tests) and .23 (for parallel tests). Another meta-analysis (Kulik, Bangert-Drowns et al., 1984) revealed that coaching raised cognitive ability scores by about .40. Recent studies (Becker, 1990; Briggs, 2001; Hausknecht, Trevor, & Farr, 2002; Jensen, 1998; Powers & Rock, 1999) confirmed these increases in cognitive ability scores across repeat examinations due to practice or coaching. We develop here the implications of four possible outcomes when an individual retests (see Table 2 ). We make two simplifying assumptions. We focus on scenarios where an individual's true score either remains constant or increases upon retesting, which we believe typifies high stakes testing. We also focus on situations where test administration is standardized. Although retest effects are certainly likely if test conditions (e.g., time limits) are unstandardized, such lack of standardization is a violation of sound testing practices.
As shown in Table 2 , the first possible outcome is that observed score change may simply be due to measurement error, resulting in either a higher or a lower observed score upon retesting. Second, increases in test scores might reflect a genuine improvement of the person's standing on the characteristic. According to this explanation, candidates are actually able to improve their KSAs due to learning or experience, resulting in higher test scores on the second administration. Third, there might be a criterion-relevant change in the observed score that reduces or eliminates a deficit between the observed score and an unchanging true score. For instance, test unfamiliarity resulted in an observed score lower than the true score on the first test, but this deficit was removed on the retest. Fourth, candidates' higher test scores on the second administration might reflect artificial improvement on the characteristic of interest, resulting from the learning of tricks, recall of repeated items, improper access to test content, or any other nonrandom source of criterion-irrelevant score improvement. Note that these scenarios are not mutually exclusive, and a sample of test takers is likely to include individuals falling into most, if not all, of these categories. Although these four explanations reflect different perspectives, all but measurement error lead to the expectation that test scores will increase upon retesting, which leads to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: On average, retaking a test will lead to an increase in test scores.
In operational selection situations, it is typically not possible to distinguish between these explanations. Nevertheless, it is useful to explore the plausibility of the explanations across various tests. Generally, the deficit reduction explanation (the criterion-relevant change) seems to be operating regardless of the type of test. The genuine improvement explanation seems particularly relevant for knowledge tests. Because knowledge tests are so specialized in terms of knowledge, it can be expected that knowledge tests are more susceptible to learning (either from own study or external interventions). The reverse seems to be the case for cognitive ability tests. Along these lines, Anastasi and Urbina (1997) place cognitive ability tests at one end of the continuum as they typically have a broad content and measure general cognitive processes that are more difficult to improve in a short period of time. Conversely, knowledge tests are situated at the other end of the continuum as their content is specialized by a specific subjectmatter field (Messick & Jungeblut, 1981) . This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: Within-person retest effects will be larger for knowledge tests than for cognitive ability tests.
We also hypothesize that the magnitude of retest effects will be different for cognitive ability tests versus SJTs. An SJT is typically seen as a method that can be used to measure various constructs (both cognitive and noncognitive; Chan & Schmitt, 1997; McDaniel et al., 2001) . Some researchers have argued that the extent to which people are able to improve their scores on an SJT is a function of the constructs measured by the SJT (Peeters & Lievens, 2005) . Specifically, score increases (either due to practice, coaching, or faking) should be less likely for SJTs that correlate heavily with cognitive ability. Conversely, people might be better able to improve their performance on SJTs when the SJTs do not show substantive correlations with cognitive ability. In this study, the SJT under investigation is an interpersonally oriented SJT that does not correlate heavily with cognitively oriented predictors. To gauge the potential retest effects associated with this SJT, prior research on retest effects on other noncognitive predictors (e.g., personality tests) might be insightful. Unfortunately, we found only one study about the effects of retaking personality tests (Kelley, Jacobs, & Farr, 1994) . This study revealed small but significant changes in personality test scores. On the basis of these empirical results and the conceptual arguments presented above, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: Within-person retest effects will be larger for interpersonally oriented SJTs than for cognitive ability tests.
A key issue with within-person retest effects is whether retesting affects criterion-related validity (i.e., whether a given person's initial test or a retest is more valid). In Table 2 , we outline the expected effects on validity of the four mechanisms for change in observed score developed above. Again, we expect that the effects of retaking a test on the relationship of the test with the criterion will differ according to the type of test considered. Specifically, we expect that retest scores will provide a more valid assessment of a person's standing on the construct of interest for knowledge tests because it can be expected that people can genuinely improve on knowledge tests. In other words, we hypothesize that increases on knowledge test scores will also yield higher levels of criterion performance. Conversely, for the other two tests (cognitive ability tests and SJTs) we expect that the retest score will differ from the initial score due to one of the two mechanisms: artificial change due to gimmicks and tricks that is unrelated to the criterion of interest (which would result in lower validity for the retest), or change due to reduction of a deficit (unfamiliarity with the test, etc.). The latter would result in higher validity for the retest, as the retest would be a better indicator of the true score. Hence, for cognitive ability tests and SJTs, we see competing mechanisms that would drive validity in opposite directions. Absent knowledge about the prevalence of these mechanisms, we will hypothesize that these opposing mechanisms cancel one another out. This leads to the following set of hypotheses:
The relationship between knowledge test scores and the relevant criterion (grade point average, GPA) will be higher for people's retest scores as compared to their initial test scores.
Hypothesis 3b: Retesting will not affect the relationship between cognitive ability test scores and a conceptually related criterion (i.e., GPA).
Hypothesis 3c: Retesting will not affect the relationship between SJT scores and a conceptually related criterion (i.e., interpersonal GPA).
Between-Person Retest Effects
Between-person retest effects involve a comparison between test scores of people who take the test only once and people who take the test twice or more. As mentioned above, it is not informative to compare mean score changes between one-time and repeat test takers. Therefore, we focus on between-person effects on validity. In terms of the criterion-related validity for one-time versus repeat test takers, Table 2 outlines the expected results for each of the four mechanisms resulting in score change upon retest. Three of the four mechanisms would not affect validity in the retest group, relative to the one-time test takers. Only if one is confident that there are no individuals in the fourth category (i.e., no individuals improved their scores due to nonrandom criterion-irrelevant factors) would one expect equal validity for one-time test takers and repeat test takers. Our expectation is that even on tests where some individuals can reasonably be expected to improve their true score through study (e.g., knowledge tests), some score change may be artifactual, and therefore we expect lower validity among repeat test takers for all tests.
Hypothesis 4: The validity of knowledge tests, cognitive ability tests, and SJTs will be lower among repeat test takers than among one-time test takers.
In addition, a differential prediction model might be used as a formal and more detailed test of whether a test score has different performance implications if it is an initial test or a retest. Without offering specific hypotheses, we view the use of the differential prediction framework as a diagnostic device that sheds light on the nature of retest effects. Specifically, a finding of identical regression lines for one-time test takers and repeat test takers would indicate that individuals' change in scores upon retesting reflects solely true change in the construct of interest, and that the fact a test taker required a second attempt to obtain a particular score is of no consequence in predicting the test taker's subsequent performance. In contrast, a finding that retest scores overpredict subsequent performance would result if changes in scores upon retesting do not reflect true changes in the construct of interest, but rather reflect mechanisms such as familiarity with test items or test wiseness. A finding that retest scores overpredict subsequent performance would also result if the fact that an individual required a second attempt to obtain a passing score signals something about the test taker above and beyond the test taker's standing on the construct measured by the test. For example, the initial failure may represent a lack of diligence in preparing for the initial test. If this lack of diligence is habitual, it may likewise affect subsequent performance. Regardless of the mechanism, though, a finding that retest scores overpredict performance would argue against using a common regression line for predicting the performance of one-time versus repeat test takers.
Method Sample and Procedure
Data were collected during the admission exams for medical studies administered between 2000 and 2003 in Belgium. Within this time span, eight examinations took place and 5,025 students (1,817 men and 3,208 women, average age = 18.10 years) completed the test battery. Figure 1 gives an overview of the flow of these applicants through the selection process. As shown in Figure 1 , 1,498 individuals passed the exam on their first attempt, whereas 3,527 individuals failed to pass the exam. Among this group, there were 1,985 individuals who retook the test battery.
Each year, the admission exam lasted for a whole day and was centrally administered in a large hall. On average, the passing rate of the admission exam was about 30%. A week after the exam, candidates obtained feedback on their test scores. Candidates who did not pass could retake the test battery. Two examinations were scheduled per year.
Predictor Measures
Since 2000, the admission exam consisted of the following tests:
1 a science knowledge test, a cognitive ability test, and an SJT. Alternate forms were developed for each examination. Once alternate forms were developed, the form used in a specific administration was randomly determined.
Science knowledge test. This test measured four science-related subjects (chemistry, physics, mathematics, and biology) and consisted of 40 questions (10 questions per subject) with four alternatives. To develop alternate forms of this test, the factorial domain sampling procedure was used (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) . This meant that, for inclusion in the alternate test, the same group of SMEs always chose 10 questions within each of the four content areas from a larger item bank with content similar to that on the original test. The items in this bank had known item properties so that the average item difficulty was held constant across alternate forms.
Cognitive ability test. This test consisted of 50 items with five response alternatives. The items were formulated in either verbal, numeric, or figural terms. Prior research documented the reliability (.84) and predictive validity (.36) of this test in a medical student population (Minnaert, 1996) . To develop alternate forms of the cognitive ability test, items were selected from a larger existing bank of items whose psychometric properties were known (i.e., the general domain sampling of Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994 ). Hence, it was possible to hold the average item difficulty constant across alternate forms.
SJT. This test consisted of short videotaped vignettes of key interpersonal situations that physicians are likely to encounter with patients. After each videotaped vignette, the scene froze and the candidate medical students were required to choose the most effective response. The original version of the SJT consisted of 30 questions of the multiple-choice type, with four response alternatives. The general aim of the SJT was to measure skills other than cognitive ability (i.e., interpersonal and communication skills). To develop alternate forms of a multidimensional test such as an SJT, we used a variant of the item-cloning procedure of Clause, Mullins, Nee, Pulakos, and Schmitt (1998) . This item-cloning procedure maximized the degree of similarity between original and parallel test items by constructing similar items in terms of content, grammatical structure, and option structure. In each examination, we built the same interpersonal incidents (e.g., handling complaints of a patient, conveying bad news) into the SJT. In addition, we tried as much as possible to include variants ("clones") of the original item stems and response alternatives in the alternate forms. However, to preserve the security of the SJT, incidents were embedded in different contexts across years. For example, in 1 year, a specific incident was built around a lower back pain problem, whereas in another year the same incident was woven into a headache complaint. Each year, 10 SMEs (experienced physicians, professors in general medicine) completed the alternate set of items and their responses were compared to the responses to the original items. In some cases, it was necessary to change/remove the parallel items/response options and insert new ones. Across years, an average of 70% of the items was judged to be parallel.
We also conducted various additional analyses to investigate the reliability and construct validity of the alternate SJT forms. These analyses were conducted on the basis of the data of the alternate forms of the SJT included in this study. First, the correlations of each of the alternate forms of the SJT with the other admission exam tests revealed a consistent picture. The alternate SJT forms typically showed low correlations with the science tests (rs around .10). The correlation between the alternate SJT forms and the cognitive ability test was consistently around .15. Second, factor analyses (principal components with varimax rotation) per SJT alternate form yielded a consistent picture as 13 or 14 factors (with eigenvalues greater than 1) were typically extracted, explaining about 55% of the variance. Third, the internal consistencies of the alternate SJT forms did not differ markedly (ranging between .30 and .40). These low internal consistency coefficients of the SJT forms are not unexpected given the multidimensional nature of SJTs (Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Clause et al., 1998) . As it has been argued that test-retest or alternate form reliability is a better reliability index for SJTs, we conducted an additional study among 250 introductory psychology students. These students completed two randomly chosen SJTs that had been developed for the admission exams included in this study, with a 1-week interval. The correlation between the two SJT scores was .66. This value is consistent with the values obtained in Clause et al. (1998; ranging between .70 and .77) given that the two sets of SJT items were presented at the same time in that study.
Although we tried to maximize the parallelism among the test forms across examinations, other psychometric interventions were not possible. First, no relevant pilot sample was available so that we could neither test nor calibrate the items a priori. As this central admission exam determined entry to medical studies in all Belgian universities, all Belgian high school seniors were potential candidates. Second, it was forbidden by law to administer items that would not be used to compute the total test score. As a result, we could not insert a group of pilot items into the actual tests. It was also forbidden by law to a posteriori weight and/or discard items. Given these situational and legal constraints, it is still possible that any single test form may be different (e.g., slightly more or less difficult, more or less reliable) than other forms. Our solution to this potential problem is to limit our examination to comparisons between candidate's first and second testing attempts. Because there were eight examination opportunities over the 4-year period, our comparison of first and second testing attempts pools data across eight different alternate forms. Accordingly, a first attempt versus second attempt comparison incorporates data from Form 1 versus Form 2 comparisons, Form 2 versus Form 3 comparisons, Form 3 versus Form 4 comparisons, Form 4 versus Form 5 comparisons, and so on. In addition, a given test form may constitute the first test attempt for one group of candidates and the second test attempt for another group of candidates. Potential difficulty or reliability differences across forms should average out using this procedure, resulting in no systematic test differences between what we label "first attempt" and "second attempt."
Criterion Measures
Two criterion measures were used. First, we retrieved archival data on students' GPA from all Belgian universities. GPA can be considered to be a more cognitively oriented criterion because it mainly consists of students' grades on science-related and medical-related subjects. Given differences across universities, we standardized students' GPA within university and within academic year. Where possible, we gathered students' GPA for several academic years because the average GPA across several years provides a more reliable estimate of students' GPA. To estimate the reliability of our criterion, we correlated GPA across years. These correlations exceeded .70, which is similar to the values found in a meta-analysis on the temporal stability of GPA (Vey et al., 2003) .
As a second criterion measure, we retrieved archival data on students' scores on interpersonally oriented courses from all Belgian universities. These criterion data were gathered because they are useful for validating an SJT that aims to measure interpersonal and communication skills. A composite score was obtained by averaging scores on interpersonal courses. Given that interpersonal courses were not included in the curriculum of some universities, this interpersonal GPA criterion was based on a smaller N than GPA was. This composite correlated .41 with GPA. 
Results

Overall Results
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the total sample of candidates (N = 5,025) who took the tests from 2000 until 2003. Given that candidates were selected on the basis of a third variable (i.e., on the basis of a cutoff score determined on an operational composite that was a weighted sum of each of the tests used), indirect range restriction (Thorndike's Case 3) occurred. As indirect range restriction is a special case of multivariate range restriction, all correlations were corrected using the multivariate range restriction formulas of Ree, Carretta, Earles, and Albert (1994) . Statistical significance was determined prior to correcting the correlations (Sackett & Yang, 2000) .
As shown in Table 3 , knowledge and cognitive ability tests were valid predictors of GPA (corrected r = .47 and r = .16, respectively), 2 2 The negative observed correlation between cognitive ability and GPA (−.07) is due to the specific form of indirect range restriction occurring here. Candidates were selected on a composite including among others the cognitive and knowledge tests. As noted by Dawes (1971) , this selection on a composite leads to the situation that the only way someone with a low cognitive test score can obtain a high enough composite score to be selected is to have a very high knowledge test score (and vice versa) . Hence, what is in reality a positive correlation between the cognitive test and GPA (corrected r = .16) becomes a very different value (r = −.07) in the restricted sample.
confirming meta-analytic findings in educational settings (Kuncel et al., 2001) . The SJT was the only valid predictor of the interpersonal composite (corrected r = .19; see Lievens et al., 2005) . Generally, these results are in line with what is found in the broad selection literature.
Examination of Within-Person Retest Effects
We started by examining the within-person part of our retesting framework. In these within-person analyses, the individuals tested remained the same, whereas the tests used were alternate forms of the same test. As outlined in Table 1 , we examined within-person change in mean scores by computing d values. These d values were obtained by subtracting the score on the second examination by the score on the first examination, divided by the total group standard deviation. Positive effect sizes mean that the second examination score was higher than the first one. The sample for these analyses consisted of the 1985 repeat test takers. Results for this group are presented in the last four columns of Table 4 .
Hypothesis 1 stated that retaking tests would lead to higher scores on all tests. As can be seen in Table 4 , all effect sizes were positive as the mean score on the second examination was always higher than the mean score on the first examination. The effect size associated with the operational composite equaled .37. These results support Hypothesis 1.
Our second set of hypotheses dealt with mean score changes on the specific tests. Specifically, we hypothesized that the effect size for cognitive ability tests would be smaller than the effect sizes for knowledge tests and SJTs. Table 4 shows that the effect sizes equaled .42 for cognitive ability and .27 for the knowledge test. The SJT had an effect size of .32. When effect sizes for different tests are compared, it is important to take account of the unreliability of the predictor. As noted by Schmitt, Clause, and Pulakos (1996) , this issue might be especially relevant for multidimensional predictors such as an SJT because the effect size associated with an SJT might be attenuated due to its lower reliability. Therefore, we corrected all effect sizes for unreliability in the predictor. In particular, for the knowledge and cognitive ability tests, a test-retest reliability value of .84 was used on the basis of prior research. For the SJT, a test-retest reliability value of .66 was used (see the reliability study described above). The last column of Table 4 reports d values corrected for unreliability in the tests. After correcting for unreliability, the effect sizes associated with the knowledge test and SJT were .30 and .40, respectively. The effect size associated with the cognitive ability test was .46. These results do not support our second set of hypotheses.
The third hypothesis stated that the relationship between knowledge test scores and GPA would be higher for people's retest scores than for ). Positive effect sizes mean that the second examination score was higher than the first one. The last column reports d values corrected for unreliability in the tests. In particular, for the knowledge and cognitive ability, a test-retest reliability value of .84 was used on the basis of prior research. For the SJT, a test-retest reliability value of .66 was used (see our description of the additional study we conducted). For the total composite, no correction was applied because we had no information on the reliability of this composite.
their initial test scores. We also hypothesized that retesting would not affect the test-criterion relationship for cognitive ability tests and for SJTs. We computed two sets of validity coefficients for the group of repeat test takers, one using the initial test and one using the retest. These correlations were corrected for multivariate range restriction and for unreliability in the predictor so that our results would not be confounded by differences in reliability across the tests. Statistical significance was determined prior to correcting the correlations. As shown in Table 5 , the validity coefficients of the knowledge test in predicting GPA differed depending on whether the test score was based on test takers' first or second time taking the test. Specifically, the second knowledge test score (r = .21, corrected r = .37, N = 556) was more valid than the first one (r = .11, corrected r = .23, N = 556). According to the Z-test of Meng et al. (1992) , this difference was statistically significant, Z = −2.24 ( p < .05). For the cognitive ability test, there was no significant difference in terms of validity coefficients for predicting GPA. The SJT validity coefficients in predicting interpersonal GPA were also not significantly different depending on whether students' initial test scores or retest scores were used as predictors. These results support Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c.
Examination of Between-Person Retest Effects
Contrary to the previous analyses, between-person analyses use test scores of two different groups of individuals: test scores of one-time test takers (second column of Table 4 , N = 1,237) and entry-gaining scores of repeat test takers (sixth column of Table 4 , N = 1,985 from which 556 passed the exam). To test Hypothesis 4, we used the differential validity model and computed the validity of each test broken down by test takers (one-time vs. repeat). Again, the appropriate corrections were applied to the correlations. The validity of the cognitive ability test was significantly (p < .05) higher for the group of one-time test takers (uncorrected r = −.04, corrected r = .28, N = 1,237) than for the group of repeat test takers (uncorrected r = −.14, corrected r = −.03, N = 556). The difference between the validity of the knowledge test for one-time (uncorrected r = .25, corrected r = .54, N = 1,237) versus repeat test takers (uncorrected r = .21, corrected r = .37, N = 556) was not significant. Note that, although the correlations do not differ when significance testing is done on uncorrected correlations, the lack of difference appears to be an artifact of differential range restriction. After range restriction correction, the validity for one-time test takers is markedly higher (.54 vs. .37). There was no significant difference between the SJT validity coefficients (uncorrected r = .15, corrected r = .20, N = 348; uncorrected r = .23, corrected r = .28, 
Note.
Correlations between parentheses are corrected correlations. The first correlation within parentheses was corrected for multivariate range restriction, whereas the second correlation within parentheses was corrected for multivariate range restriction and unreliability in the predictor. With regard to the latter, the same values as in Table 4 were used. a The Z test of Meng et al. (1992) was used to examine whether the difference between the two correlation coefficients was statistically significant. * p < .05; * * p < .01. We also examined between-person retest effects by conducting a moderated multiple regression with the entry-gaining total score (the operational composite) for each individual as predictor, a dummy variable reflecting initial versus retest status, and an interaction term between the two. We were not able to run a moderated regression analysis with each test as predictor because otherwise we would suffer from the omitted variables problem 3 in regression analysis (Sackett et al., 2003) . We focused only on GPA as dependent variable because the total composite score aims to predict GPA (and not interpersonal GPA). Table 6 presents the results of the moderated regression analysis. As can be seen, there was a significant effect for the retest dummy in predicting GPA. This finding of an intercept difference in the context of retesting indicates that the prediction on the basis of the operational composite could be enhanced by including retest status. In other words, a total test score of a repeat test taker did not have the same expected performance consequences as the same total test score obtained by a one-time test taker. In particular, a mean regression line would underpredict the total score for one-time test takers and overpredict the total score of repeat test takers. There was also a significant interaction effect between the retest status dummy and the operational composite in predicting GPA. However, given that the R 2 increment was only .004, we view this as too small to be of practical significance.
Discussion
Retest effects have been mostly studied in controlled research settings. However, the prevalence of retesting in operational selection necessitates that we also understand in what way retest effects might compromise measurement accuracy in field settings. Along these lines, this study has both conceptual and empirical contributions. The remainder discusses these contributions together with implications and limitations of our findings.
Conceptual Contributions
In this study, we developed a comprehensive framework for examining retest effects in operational selection settings. Several features make this framework valuable. First, our framework distinguishes within-person and between-person retest effects. This is an important conceptual contribution because extant retesting research has mainly focused on within-person mean score changes. Yet, in most practical selection situations, people who do well the first time do not retake the test, but they are compared with people who did, making between-person retest issues equally important.
Second, we outlined the various underlying reasons for observed score changes upon retesting (see the four categories in Table 2 ) and delineated their hypothesized effects on validity (both in within-person and betweenperson analyses). Gathering information about mean score changes in combination with validity changes enables researchers and practitioners to more forcefully disentangle the reasons behind retest effects. For instance, suppose a mean score change observed for a specific test is accompanied by lower validity of the retest (as compared to the initial test) and by lower validity for repeat test takers as compared to one-time test takers. In this specific case, Table 2 shows that retest effects probably occurred due to criterion-irrelevant variance (e.g., tricks or gimmicks).
Finally, our framework outlines which specific analytical strategies might be used to examine the various retest effects. Specifically, it emphasizes examining between-person retest effects through the differential validity and differential prediction approaches. Application of differential prediction is a useful diagnostic technique for investigating whether a given score is linked to the same level of expected criterion performance regardless of whether it is an initial score or a retest score. Hence, this approach further helps to distinguish between true and artifactual score change.
In short, our framework opens a window of opportunity for more systematically and conclusively investigating retest issues in field settings. We believe its application is not bound to an educational context (cf. this study) but is equally useful in both private and public sector selection.
Empirical Contributions
This study contributes to the retesting literature by examining retest effects for exemplars of three tests in terms of mean score and validity changes. Regarding mean score changes, significant retest effects were found for all tests, with effect sizes varying between about one-third and one-half of a standard deviation. The effect size found for cognitive ability in this study is in line with previous lab and field studies (Hausknecht et al., 2002; . Conversely, the retest effects for knowledge tests and for a new test format, the SJT, are smaller than hypothesized. Especially, the small retest effect for the knowledge test (as compared to the one found for the cognitive ability test) seems surprising. An explanation might be that the magnitude of a retest effect on a knowledge test is a function of the breadth of the knowledge domain. If the domain is one subtopic within biology (e.g., photosynthesis), it is easier to change one's true score than if the domain is the whole of biology. And changing one's true score in biology is easier than changing one's true score on science in general, including biology, physics, chemistry, and so on. In our study, the science domain is very broad. Although the change observed is likely to be true change (e.g., new knowledge), if the test is intended to tap knowledge that is acquired by most test takers through many years of intense study, it seems reasonable that the change resulting from studying for a number of months prior to a retest would be modest. Future studies are needed to better understand the moderating role of domain breadth in explaining retest effects for knowledge tests.
Another contribution to the extant retesting literature is that our analytical approaches enabled us to start examining why retest effects occurred. For cognitive ability tests, we found that validity was significantly lower for repeat test takers as compared to one-time test takers. In addition, our study revealed that the validity of initial cognitive ability test scores of repeat test takers was lower (albeit not significant) than the validity of their retest scores. According to the categories listed in Table 2 , the combination of these two pieces of validity evidence suggests that the observed score change on cognitive ability tests is probably mainly due to criterionirrelevant variance (category 4). For knowledge tests, our study found that their validity was not significantly different for one-time test takers as compared to repeat test takers. Further, initial knowledge test scores of repeat test takers were significantly higher than their retest scores. As shown by Table 2 , this combination of validity evidence seems to suggest that genuine improvement (Category 2) and/or deficit reduction (Category 3) are mainly responsible for the effects. A similar conclusion might be gleaned for SJTs because the validity of SJTs was equal for one-time and repeat test takers, whereas initial SJT scores of repeat test takers were lower (albeit not significant) than their retest scores. Although the above provides an explanation for the retest effects for each of the three tests, an important caveat is in order. A sample of repeat test takers is likely to include individuals falling into all of the four categories of Table 2 . For some test takers, other explanations might be tenable. Hence, the aforementioned explanations apply to the repeat test-taker group as a whole.
Some might argue that the results of the within-person and betweenperson retest effects on validity are contradictory because some withinperson results show that scores of repeat test takers have higher validity, whereas some between-person results reveal that scores of one-time test takers lead to higher validity. Yet, there is nothing paradoxical in these results. Basically, our results show that in these data, validity is typically highest when only one-time test takers are included. This means that validity obtained on a sample of one-time test takers is higher than validity obtained on the basis of either the first or second test score of repeat test takers. Next, among repeat test takers, a validity coefficient obtained on the basis of a repeat score (on knowledge tests) is higher than a validity coefficient obtained on the basis of an initial score on these tests.
A last important conclusion is that a given test score has different performance implications for one-time test takers than for repeat test takers. Results from our differential prediction analysis showed that the performance implications were different for one-time test takers than for repeat test takers. On the basis of these results, we recommend that more attention be paid to test-taking status when computing validity coefficients in primary and secondary (meta-analytic) studies.
Limitations
First, this study was conducted in an operational setting. Hence, there is less control than in experimental settings. Specifically, we neither had control over nor had information about the nature or extent of test preparation activities (e.g., study, practice, coaching) intervening between first and second administration of the examination. Therefore, we concentrated on the broader phenomenon of retest effects. Future laboratory studies are needed to disentangle these different effects.
A second possible limitation is that this study was conducted in an educational context in Belgium. There are some differences between admission practices in Belgium and the United States. For example, in Belgium the admission process is centralized and the level of selectivity (30% passing rate) is less stringent than in the United States. Yet, there are also many similarities in admission practices between Belgium and the United States. For example, in both countries it has been suggested to supplement cognitive predictors with SJTs (Oswald et al., 2004; Lievens et al., 2005) . Hence, we believe that our results might generalize to high stakes testing in other countries such as the United States. In addition, our results might be relevant for high stakes employment testing in the public sector (e.g., selection of firefighters, law enforcement jobs) as the retesting policies for those jobs share many parallels with retesting policies in high stakes educational testing. In any case, future studies are needed to examine the generalizability of our results in other settings and countries.
Third, GPA served as the criterion in this study. Therefore, future research should examine whether our results generalize to employment settings with job performance as the criterion. It is worth noting, however, that much validation work in employment settings is against training criteria. In addition, although there are certainly differences between work settings and education settings, note that the context where we find the SJT useful is in the less academic settings, namely interpersonal courses. It can be argued that activities in such courses are more similar to "work" than are courses in the sciences. In addition, grades on interpersonal courses are often not based on regular exams but on practical exercises.
Implications for Retesting Practice
Applicants typically retake tests to obtain higher scores. In turn, this would increase their probability of being selected. Our study provided only partial support for the premise that a retest score is more valid than an initial score. For cognitive ability tests and SJTs, it did not seem to matter which scores were used. Only for knowledge tests, the score related to the most recent (i.e., second) examination seems to be preferred as this score had significantly higher validities. In additional analyses, we also examined whether using the average of the scores on the first and the second examination increased the validity of the knowledge test, as this average score might be more reliable. The uncorrected validity of the average knowledge test score was .18 (as compared to .21 for the most recent knowledge test score).
Implications for Future Research
As mentioned above, there exists a paucity of research on retesting in operational selection situations. This lack of research contrasts with the widespread use of retesting in practice. Therefore, future research is needed to test the viability of current retesting policies in organizations. This study provided research-based evidence for one key assumption underlying retesting in organizations (i.e., should the most recent score be used when multiple scores on the same test are available?). Other retesting issues deal with the time lag between initial and repeat test administrations or with the maximum number of retests. Organizations typically follow best practices to determine such retesting policies. There is a critical need for more research-based evidence to support them.
As a second avenue for future research, it is important to understand which applicants decide to retake the tests. As shown in Table 4 , about 1,542 people did not retake the tests, whereas 1,985 retook the tests. It would be worthwhile to examine which demographic, motivational, and test score differences exist between the group who decides to give up and the group who decides to retake the tests. Table 4 suggests that people who did not retake the tests scored especially low on the knowledge test. Clearly, future research is needed along these lines. To this end, one could draw on research on applicant withdrawal in multistage selection (Ryan, Sacco, McFarland, & Kriska, 2000) .
Third, our framework might be extended by including changes in adverse impact as another dependent variable apart from mean score and test-criterion changes (Campbell, 2004) . If subgroup differences on a test exist, policies that permit retests by candidates who were unsuccessful on the test might inflate calculations of adverse impact.
